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Too Strange to be Just Fiction: Legal Lessons from a
Bioterrorist Simulation, the Case of TOPOFF 2
John D. Blum*
In the post 9/11 world, a strange and troubling convergence of
public health and terrorism has occurred. What was once fodder for
science fiction novels, bioterrorism is now an increased area of
concern around the globe. The threat of bioterrorism, real or
perceived, can have a paralyzing impact on the daily life of any
nation, and in a world on high alert the concern over biological
mayhem is anything but remote. The challenges faced by
government in addressing bioterrorism are both scientifically and
operationally perplexing. On the one hand, there is a lack of
consensus about the nature and viability of health threats posed by a
seemingly ever-expanding array of disease agents. From an
operational standpoint, major logistical challenges are raised in the
attempt to coordinate appropriate responses to respective threats,
forcing integration of civil defense and health agencies at all levels
of government. The law that underpins our responses to bioterrorism
represents a disparate collection of powers and principles that do not
necessarily mesh together. Even in the context of public health, the
relevant laws are a rather strange hodgepodge of local, state, and
federal principles developed over a long period of time and typically
lacking in cohesiveness. This paper will focus on law in the
bioterrorism context, and that focus will center on the active and
reactive roles that the law played in one bioterrorism exercise,
TOPOFF 2. The discussion will be concentrated on the legal
considerations raised in the Illinois portion of the TOPOFF 2
exercise, the largest simulated event of its kind to date. In addition
to reviewing the TOPOFF 2 scenario and the relevant legal issues
raised by the exercise, the paper will draw conclusions concerning
the broader role of law in confronting bioterrorism threats.
THE EXERCISE
On May 10, 2003, unknown biological agents were released at
O'Hare Airport, United Center, and Union Station in Chicago, all
major venues frequented by large numbers of people.' On May 12,
Copyright 2004, by LOUISIANA LAW REvIEw.
* John J. Waldron Research Professor of Health Law, Loyola University
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1. Dep't. of Homeland Security, Top Officials (TOPOFF) Exercise Series:
TOPOFF 2-After Action Summary Report (Dec. 19, 2003), available at
http://www.mipt.org/pdf/TOPOFF2AfterActionRpt.pdf [hereinafter TOPOFF 2
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in Seattle, Washington, a "dirty bomb" was ignited causing concerns
over radiation exposure in that region, and resulting in the Homeland
Security Advisory System (HSAS) raising the threat level across the
country to the highest rating, "red."' The Seattle event triggered
local, county, and state responses in Illinois (as well as across the
nation) as respective, responsible units of government, including the
Illinois Department of Public Health (IDPH) and area hospitals, were
placed on a heightened alert for a possible terrorist event.3 During
the evening of Sunday, May 12, hospitals across Northeastern Illinois
(in Cook, DuPage, Kane, and Lake Counties) began notifying IDPH
of an unusual increase in emergency room visits by patients with
symptoms of lower respiratory tract infections.4 By 7 a.m. on the
following day, thirty-three hospitals had reported a total of seventy-
six cases of undetermined respiratory tract infections in mostly young
and middle aged adults who presented with fever, cough, shortness
of breath, and chest pain.' In response, the IDPH mobilized its rapid
response teams and requested that the Centers for Disease Control
(CDC) send epidemic intelligence officers to Illinois to assist local
health departments.6 In addition, IDPH notified hospital emergency
departments, hospital infection control practitioners, and infectious
disease physicians of the occurrence of this infection, and invoked
necessary powers to insure that area hospital emergency rooms
remained open.' By 8 a.m. on May 13, IDPH had developed a
preliminary case definition for an infectious disease that was soon
replaced by a plague case definition; simultaneously, IDPH received
notification of fourteen dead due to the infection, with an estimated
269 others dying.8 At 4 p.m. the state lab confirmed a positive PRC
for plague, and several minutes later, at 4:05 p.m., the Governor of
Illinois declared a state of emergency and requested an expedited
Presidential Disaster Declaration, followed by a request based on an
IDPH recommendation that CDC release the Strategic National
After Action Report]. See also David Kestenbaum, National Terrorism Drills to
Help Emergency Responders Prepare for Disasters, Talk of the Nation: Science
Friday (NPR radio broadcast, Mayl6, 2003).
2. Michael Gentry-Wiseman, TOPOFF 2 Only Memo: Threat Elevation, May
12,2003 (on file with author).
3. TOPOFF 2 After Action Report, supra note 1.
4. As part of the TOPOFF 2 actors were hired who showed up at hospitals in
Northern Illinois and were "worked up" as though they were regular patients.
5. Author notes based on on-site observations, May 13, 2003, and from notes
taken from a classified document, TOPOFF 2, Master Scenario Events List (MSEL)
Short Description and Procedural Flow Synopsis (PROFLOW), 11. State Edition
(May 2003).
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
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Stockpile, a federal program which provides bulk medication packets
for treatment and prophylactic purposes.9 By 8 p.m. on May 13,
IDPH had reports that fifty-seven people had died from the plague
and that another 403 individuals were dying. 0
By 8 a.m. on May 14 the numbers had increased to 351 dead and
2,214 dying, with confirmation being received by IDPH from
hospital labs that blood cultures were confirming the diagnosis of
plague." By mid-morning drugs were received from the CDC
national stockpile; considerable activity on May 14 entailed the
breakdown and distribution of the stockpile drugs, with a priority
being that first responders receive necessary pharmaceuticals, and
that five local distribution centers be supplied with drugs for the
general public.' 2 By the end of the day, 646 were dead and another
2,332 were dying.' On May 15, law enforcement identified a bio-
laboratory being operated by a terrorist cell in the Chicago area. 4 On
the same day, an air crash occurred at Chicago Midway airport,
allegedly caused by terrorists, which further complicated the
emergency response to the broad public health crisis. 15 By the end of
the plague outbreak on May 16, 2,287 individuals had died from the
plague, with an estimated 4,433 others dying, dramatically taxing the
resources of the sixty-four involved hospitals.' 6 In addition to the
events noted, several key declarations were made that influenced this
exercise.
Homeland Security Secretary Tom Ridge declared a "snow day"
which permitted individuals in the affected areas to remain at home
during the plague outbreak. President George W. Bush, under the
auspices of the Stafford Act, 17 issued a disaster declaration, which
allowed for federal assistance, and the Secretary of Health and
Human Services Tommy G. Thompson issued a public health
emergency declaration under the United States Public Health
Services Act,' 8 which also made it possible for Illinois to obtain other
assistance. 19
Fortunately TOPOFF 2 was not real, and was only an elaborate
exercise in "how to attempt" to respond to two serious and successive
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 5121-5206 (2000).
18. Public Health Services Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 201-300hh-11 (2000).
19. Id. § 247d(a).
2000] 907
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bioterrorism attacks in two major American cities, Seattle and
Chicago respectively. The exercise, mandated by the Congress, was
the largest, simulated, mock terrorism event to date, costing a total of
sixteen million dollars and bringing together top government officials
from twenty-five federal, state, and local agencies, as well as
individuals representing key preparedness areas of the Canadian
government.2" The chief agency sponsors of TOPOFF 2 were the
United States Department of Homeland Security/Office of Domestic
Preparedness and the United States Department of State/Office of the
Coordinator for Counterterrorism. 2' While the largest, TOPOFF 2
was not the first simulated terrorism drill. TOPOFF 1, which
preceded TOPOFF 2, occurred in May 2000, and involved an
unannounced release of mustard gas in Portsmouth, New Hampshire,
and the release of plague in Denver, Colorado, under the direction of
the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the United2z
States Department of Justice (DOJ). Unlike the initial exercise,
TOPOFF 2 was not a surprise; instead it involved widespread,
advanced planning and coordination, likely reflecting the fact that
very basic, foundational work needs to be done in our emergency
response systems before it can realistically handle a "real" event of
the magnitude of the exercise. In the report on TOPOFF 1, a "no
notice" event, it was concluded that the exercise was characterized
by multiple direction and control nodes, numerous liaisons, and an
increasing number of response teams that complicated coordination,
communication, and unity of effort-in essence, considerable
disorganization.23 While TOPOFF 2 was more complicated than its
predecessor, the goals of the exercise were to develop the "building
blocks" of national preparedness, and to develop and strengthen
relationships of key actors at all levels of government.24 In essence
the exercise involved all of the major activities of public health
related to emergency preparedness, including surveillance,
epidemiological investigation and analysis, laboratory investigation
and analysis, intervention, risk communication, planning,
community-wide response, and perhaps unique to bioterrorism, the
involvement of law enforcement.25
20. TOPOFF 2 After Action Report, supra note 1. See also, John A. Heaton,
Anne M. Murphy, Susan Allan, & Harold Pietz, Legal Preparedness for Public
Health Emergencies: TOPOFF 2 and Other Lessons, 31 J.L. Med. & Ethics 43
(2003).
21. TOPOFF 2 After Action Report, supra note 1.
22. National Response Team, Exercise TOPOFF 2000 and National Capital
Region (NCR) After-Action Report 1 (Aug. 2001), available at http://www.nrt.org/
production/nrt/home.nsf/resources/Publications/$File/TOPOFFAARFINAL.doc.
23. Id. at 4-13.
24. TOPOFF 2 After Action Report, supra note 1, at 2.
25. Bernard Turnock, Public Health: What It Is and How It Works 313-58 (3d
[Vol. 64
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GENERAL LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS
From a legal standpoint, the TOPOFF 2 exercise served as a
catalyst for legal officials in the IDPH to conduct an analysis of law
related to public health emergencies, with a view toward
understanding the scope of existing law, as well as the administrative
and judicial mechanisms needed in order to apply this broad
collection of law. The appreciation of relevant law is a complex
matter in the context of a public health emergency as there are
multiple agencies at all levels of the government that become
involved. It is not only a matter of federalism in which the scope and
coordination of powers between federal and state governments must
be recognized, which includes interagency policies at the same
governmental levels, but local government involvement (municipal
and county) is also a matter that needs to be appreciated. In Illinois
virtually all of the state's 100 counties have local public health
departments with their own policies, and in some cases separate
ordinances.
Under the auspices of the IDPH Chief Counsel, a detailed source
book of law was compiled which contains a comprehensive portrait
of all relevant local, state, and national laws that may be needed in
addressing a bioterrorist emergency. 26 There has been a national
movement, encouraged by the CDC, to enact the Model State
Emergency Health Powers Act, which is an attempt to update and
centralize state public health powers into a single statute that would
more clearly spell out legal powers and processes." Illinois, however,
had not enacted such an emergency powers law, so it became
necessary in the TOPOFF 2 preparation to collect all related state
laws, such as the powers of the Governor to suspend statutes and
rules, 8 utilize state and local resources,29 taking powers,3° authority
to order evacuation,3' etc. In addition, other relevant state laws had
to be identified and understood, such as the Illinois Emergency
Management Agency Act,32 the Emergency Management Assistance
ed. 2004).
26. See TOPOFF 2 Legal Team Handbook (2003), available at
http://www.uic.edu/ sph/prepare/courses/chsc400/resources/topoff2legal.pdf
[hereinafter Handbook].
27. Model State Emergency Health Powers Act (Draft for Discussion 2001),
available at http://www.publichealthlaw.net/Resources/Modellaws.htm. See also
Lawrence 0. Gostin, et al., The Model State Emergency Health Powers Act, 288
J. Am. Med. Ass'n 622 (2002).
28. 20 Ill. Comp. Stat. 3305/7(a) (2004).
29. 20 Ill. Comp. Stat. 3305/7(a)(1) (2004).
30. 20 11. Comp. Stat. 3305/7(a)(4) (2004).
31. 20 111. Comp. Stat. 3305/7(a)(5) (2004).
32. Illinois Emergency Management Agency Act, 20 Ill. Comp. Stat.
2000]
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Compact Act,33 the Emergency Medical Services Systems Act,34 the
Hospital Licensing Act,35 and the Department of Public Health Act.36
Laws affecting local governments, such as portions of the Illinois
Municipal Code37 and the Counties Code,38 needed to be assessed in
the planning process as well.
At the federal level TOPOFF 2's legal preparation necessitated
awareness of the public health emergency powers of the Secretary of
Health and Human Services, as well as the powers of the Secretary
of Homeland Security, to respond to a bioterrorist attack. In addition,
an appreciation of the role of the United States Surgeon General in a
public health emergency (i.e. control of communicable diseases and
quarantine), as well as the role of the CDC, was gained through
TOPPOFF 2. 39 There was a need to understand the emergency
powers of the President under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief
and Emergency Assistance Act and the relevant distinctions in the
Stafford Act between declarations of an emergency and a disaster.40
Of particular interest was the federal Strategic National Stockpile
program run by the United States Department of Homeland Security,
which maintains drugs, vaccines, and other biological products
necessary for the country's emergency health security.4' It was
critical for the state of Illinois's officials to understand the stockpile
program generally, and the legal and operational mechanisms
required to access and distribute the necessary drugs for treatment
and prophylactic purposes.42
An area of great importance in bioterrorism concerns the law
affecting isolation and quarantine, with the former referring to the
enforced seclusion of individuals who have contracted a contagious
illness, and the later entailing seclusion of those who have been
3305/1-3305/22 (2004). See id. 3305/14.
33. Emergency Management Assistance Compact Act, 45 111. Comp. Stat.
151/1-151/99 (2004).
34. Emergency Medical Services (EMS) Systems Act, 210 Ill. Comp. Stat.
50/1-50/33 (2004). See id. 50/13.150.
35. Hospital Licensing Act, 210 Ill. Comp. Stat. 85/1-85/16 (2004).
36. Department of Public Health Act, 20 Ill. Comp. Stat. 2305/1-2305/8.4
(2004). See id. 2305/2 (powers of the department of public health).
37. 65 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/11-17-1-5/11-17-12 (2004).
38. 55 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/1-1001-5/7-1001 (2004).
39. 42 U.S.C. § 254(b) & (c). See also, Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention, Fact Sheet on Isolation and Quarantine, at http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/
sars/isolationquarantine.htm.
40. Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 5121-5206 (2000).
41. See Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Strategic National
Stockpile, August 11, 2003, at http://www.bt.cdc.gov/stockpile/index.asp.
42. 42 U.S.C. 300hh-12 (2004).
910 [Vol. 64
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exposed to a particular contagion.43 While it is clear that the ultimate
authority for isolation and quarantine rests with the IDPH, as noted
in the Chief Counsel's report, laws concerning these matters at the
county and municipal level need to be considered,' as well as federal
laws concerning the powers of the United States Surgeon General45
and CDC guidelines in this area.
A detailed example of local authority in this area can be seen in
the Municipal Code of the City of Chicago. The City of Chicago's
Department of Health has the authority to mandate medical
examinations, isolation, and quarantine; the department's code
specifies the processes which must be followed, including the
requirement that a court order must be obtained in the event an
affected person refuses to consent to such mandates.46 Similarly,
Cook County has an ordinance that allows the County Health
Department to respond to public health emergencies, and includes the
authority to mandate isolation and quarantine.47 While there are no
major differences discernable in the laws noted that impact isolation
and quarantine, the differences that do exist need to be appreciated,
particularly in reference to the rights of the affected individuals. It
is not enough to acknowledge that the state law overrides local
policies when it comes to isolation and quarantine, because in a
crisis situation it is likely that the laws and policies at the
governmental level, at which responders are working, will not guide
them, and notions of preemption may not rule the day. Appropriate
concerns must also be directed toward creating some uniformity in
the nature of evidence required by the courts and public health
officials alike, to justify issuing orders to isolate or quarantine
individuals or groups.
A significant number of the issues reviewed in the Chief
Counsel's Legal Handbook (Handbook) in preparation for the
TOPOFF 2 exercise concern matters that may not be as apparent for
emergency preparedness as those previously noted.48 For example,
the question of whether state workers' compensation, which applies
to government employees in a bioterrorism response situation, should
be applied to volunteers was addressed in the Handbook.49 It was
determined, based on an Illinois Attorney General Opinion, that
43. Jill Moore, Isolation and Quarantine: Principle Sources of Law for N.C.
PHRST Teams (May 2004), available at http://www.sph.unc.edu/nccphp/i-and-q/
IandQ-sources-ofjlaw.pdf.
44. 20 Ill. Comp. Stat. 2305/2 (2004).
45. 42 U.S.C. § 267 (2004).
46. Municipal Code of Chicago § 2-112-080 (2004).
47. Cook County Illinois Ordinance No. 04-0-13 (2004).
48. Handbook, supra note 25.
49. Id.
2000]
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volunteers could be treated as state employees for purposes of
workers' compensation, but to do so, the individual in question must
be working in conjunction with the Illinois Emergency Management
Agency (IEMA).5 The matter of governmental liability or immunity
needed to be considered in the emergency response context. Under
the JEMA, the state, its employees, and its agents cannot be held
liable for death, injury, or property damage in carrying out their
duties in response to an emergency situation, unless guilty of gross
negligence or willful misconduct.51 Such immunity applies to
responders who cross state lines under the terms of the state
Emergency Management Assistance Compact Act.52 The Illinois
Good Samaritan Act53 provides immunity to licensed health
professionals from Illinois and elsewhere, unless the conduct in
question spills over into the area of gross negligence.54 Other matters
considered by the IDPH legal team included the information, privacy
issues under the federal Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act (HIPAA), state laws affecting disposition of
human remains, state purchasing authority, governmental takings of
property, the licensure and credentialing of health professionals in
emergency situations, and the powers of law enforcement agencies
as responders.55
Beyond the detailed review of relevant law, the IDPH legal team
prepared four model executive orders for the TOPOFF 2 exercise,
anticipating necessary responses to the public health emergency.56 The
first Executive Order concerned sharing communicable disease reports
and laboratory tests between IDPH and law enforcement officials,
suspending provisions of the Communicable Disease Report Act and
the Illinois Clinical Laboratory and Blood Bank Act. 7  Hospital
representatives expressed concern that Illinois law does not allow
hospitals to grant staff privileges to volunteer physicians in the event
of a disaster, therefore, the second Executive Order suspended relevant
provisions of the Health Care Professionals Credentialing Data
Collection Act and the Hospital Licensing Act to allow volunteer
physicians privileges. 58 The third Executive Order was drafted to
50. 111. Att'y Gen. Op. No. 1-88-019 (May 4, 1988).
51. 20 111. Comp. Stat. 3305/15 (2004).
52. 45 I11. Comp. Stat. 151/5 (2004).
53. 745 Ill. Comp. Stat. 49/1-49/120 (2004).
54. Id. 49/25 (2004).
55. Handbook, supra note 25.
56. Id.
57. Id. See also 745 I11. Comp. Stat. 45/1 (2004) (confidentiality provisions of
the Communicable Disease Report Act); 210 Ill. Comp. Stat. 25/9-101 (2004)
(provision of the Illinois Clinical Laboratory and Blood Bank Act which prevents
sharing results of laboratory tests with law enforcement).
58. Handbook, supra note 25. See also 410 111. Comp. Stat. 517/20 (2004); 210
912 [Vol. 64
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address the fear that there might not be an adequate number of
physicians, nurses, and pharmacists to address a large-scale medical
emergency. 59 The third order suspended the Pharmacy Practice Act 60
to allow individuals, other than pharmacists, to dispense medications.61
The third order also authorized the distribution and administration of
medications at locations other than pharmacies, and it provided a
general order describing the class of individuals who should receive
medications, as well as what medications should be administered.62
In addition, the third order extended the scope of practice for physician
assistants and emergency medical technicians, and it allowed for the
possible suspension of laws affecting other health professionals, such
as optometrists, physical therapists, and podiatrists, whereby the
scopes of their practice would be broadened if human resource needs
caused by an event of bioterrorism so dictated. 63 The fourth Executive
Order addressed the area of isolation and quarantine by laying out two
options. One option involved the isolation and quarantine of affected
individuals without prior court order, whereas the second option would
provide for mass quarantine and isolation of populations and/or
limitations on ingress and egress in affected geographical areas. 4
Recognizing that there could be a delay in obtaining the
Governor's approval of the respective Executive Orders, the IDPH
Chief Counsel, in cooperation with Cook County, prepared two court
petitions. One petition concerned an order to empower the IDPH and
Cook County to isolate individuals who had been exposed to the
plague without having to seek special permission in each case under an
emergency isolation order.65 The second petition entailed a request for
an emergency isolation and quarantine order that would also absolve
the state and the county from having to seek such permission in all
cases.66 As part of its planning process, the IDPH not only prepared
the two petitions previously discussed, but it also contacted a Cook
County judge in advance, with experience in public health matters,
alerting him to the fact that he should be available to consider such
67petitions.
I11. Comp. Stat. 85/1-85/16 (2004) (suspended statutes).
59. Handbook, supra note 25.
60. Pharmacy Practice Act, 225 Ill. Comp. Stat. 85/1-85/40 (2004).
61. Handbook, supra note 25.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Petition for Emergency Isolation Order, Not an Actual Court Pleading, For
TOPOFF 2 Exercise Use Only (on file with author).
66. Petition for Emergency Quarantine and Isolation Order, Not an Actual
Court Pleading, For TOPOFF 2 Exercise Use Only (on file with author).
67. Comments by Ann Murphy, Ill. Dep't of Pub. Health Legal Counsel, to
Author, May 13, 2003).
2000] 913
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OBSERVATIONS FROM THE EXERCISE
Within the TOPOFF 2 exercise itself, the legal preparations noted
facilitated a reasonably smooth response to the disaster. The key
challenge faced by all of those involved in TOPOFF 2, including the
attorneys, was maintaining an effective chain of communication
throughout the exercise and sustaining a timely and appropriate
response to the simulation, which was appreciative of the roles of all
of the actors at the various governmental levels. TOPOFF 2 involved
8,500 people from multiple government agencies, as well as private
organizations, with occupational diversity ranging from police and
fire, to epidemiologists and infectious disease specialists.68 The
logistics of coordinating such a large scale exercise were daunting,
and one can only imagine how much more challenging coordination
would be in a real, unplanned event, because, as many public health
experts have observed, everyone is in favor of coordination, but no
one wants to be coordinated.69
The exercise demonstrated that the legal response was
inextricably linked to the public health identification of the nature of
the medical problems as pneumonic plague and not influenza, and
that the recognition of plague as a genuine emergency by the
Executive was necessary to trigger the armament of prepared legal
responses. It was also clear from the exercise that there will be
considerable confusion about the nature of a biological threat,
particularly a novel one, and that decision makers will be operating
in an environment characterized by chaos. The challenge for the
legal responders was to stay abreast of the thinking of the public
health science officials and to maintain a presence in the decision-
making process in all aspects of the unfolding events. The legal
responders at the state level maintained close contact with the
lawyers at the municipal and county levels and with the legal
representatives of federal agencies; however, contacts need to be
maintained with decision makers in all facets of response. The
exercise did reveal a certain tension among the various branches of
government, as each branch sought to assert itself in the decision
making process, often without adequately coordinating individual
responses with other government units, complicating legal
approaches to the emergency.
While questions were posed to the legal team concerning the
duties of first responders, the rights of responders and contacts to
obtain chemoprophylaxis, and various inquiries about isolation and
68. Author Notes, supra note 5.
69. Handbook, supra note 25, at 326-34 (illustrating the difficulties of
coordination in bioterrorism emergencies).
[Vol. 64914
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quarantine, a number of federal law matters also surfaced. For
example, questions arose about whether HIPAA' s privacy protections
prevent disaster response agencies and authorities from sharing
patient specific information, without obtaining authorization from the
named party. It was determined, that the HIPAA regulations
covering the privacy provisions of the law allowed for use or
disclosure of protected health information by public or private
entities authorized to assist in disaster relief efforts.7" Questions of
federal law were raised about whether hospital emergency rooms
faced with a regional crisis could turn patients away due to the
unprecedented numbers of individuals they were dealing with, and
how referral mandates could be met. Under the federal Emergency
Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA)7" hospitals
with emergency rooms are legally obligated to screen all individuals
who come into the emergency room and to treat those in an
emergency condition.72 In consultation with the Department of
Health and Human Services the legal team determined that the
Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services could
waive the EMTALA requirements in a disaster situation.73 It was
also determined that state or local authorities could develop a
community protocol that would direct emergency care in the event of
a plague situation.
BROAD LEGAL OBSERVATIONS
Perhaps the most significant lesson in reference to the law and
TOPOFF 2 is the most obvious, namely the fact that the law at the
intersection of public health and bioterrorism is extremely unsettled.
There is not a lack of law to draw upon in addressing specific
questions, but rather a myriad of laws that must be considered, most
of which were developed to address more mundane public health
matters, or designed to respond to more traditional emergency
situations. It is critical, as demonstrated clearly in TOPOFF 2, that
lawyers need to develop a sophisticated awareness of a large body of
disjointed, but relevant law, not only concerning public health, but
also focusing on emergency and security law matters as well. The
body of law that must be referenced is not only large, but it may be
frustrating in that it will often not provide adequate guidance or
sufficient remedies to questions that may arise in the bioterrorism
context. Even recent legislation such as the federal Stafford Act,
70. 45 C.F.R. § 164.510(b)(4) (2004).
71. Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd
(2004).
72. Id.
73. Id. § 1320b-5.
2000] 915
HeinOnline  -- 64 La. L. Rev. 915 2003-2004
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
which was designed to address national emergencies, does not allow
bioterrorism attacks to be classified as major disasters as the Act is
currently constituted, thereby reflecting the reality that law may
never provide adequate answers or remedies for unforeseen
occurrences.
In light of the fluid and awkward nature of this large and
disjointed body of laws that touch on bioterrorism issues, the
experiences of the lawyers in TOPOFF 2 seem to suggest that the
lessons for the future lie not so much in finding "magic bullets," but
rather, rest in developing a sense of awareness as to how
unpredictable, health disasters can be addressed, at least in part,
through an orderly, legal process of decision making. TOPOFF 2
demonstrated that it is critical that lawyers appreciate that a
successful legal response to bioterrorism will require a harmonization
of laws at the local, state, and federal level. Lawyers working at any
given governmental level must be respectful of the existence and
impacts of laws at all levels of government, and should not merely
assume that preemption principles will moot the need for such
harmonization. It is critical for the legal responders to be sensitive
to the rights of affected individuals and the public at large, because
in the heat of the moment concern for individual rights may be seen
as a secondary matter. In particular, heightened sensitivity to human
rights must be exhibited in areas where physical imposition or
restraint come into question, such as isolation, quarantine, and
mandated medical examinations. While considerable progress is
being made in coordinating approaches to the age-old practices of
isolation and quarantine, other rights issues in this context remain
open questions, such as the need to be sensitive to post-deprivation
rights, the right to legal counsel, the nature of clinical evidence
required to justify such measures, and the policies concerning the
application of isolation and quarantine to populations.
Finally, all of those involved with bioterrorism should keep in
mind that the law is a tool that can be very helpful in underpinning a
response to the threat of biological terror. As things stand now, the
law is seen as a secondary matter to health responses in bioterrorism,
and as demonstrated by TOPOFF 2, it may be viewed more as an
impediment than assistance. Law, like other tools of public health,
such as epidemiology and laboratory science, must be shaped in such
a manner that it can be quickly referenced and readily applied, and
only then will it be appreciated more broadly as a critical part of the
armament of public health. While we may be a long way from a
comprehensive, cohesive, and coordinated approach to law in
reference to bioterrorism, experiences such as TOPOFF 2 should be
taken to heart by legislatures and regulators as a catalyst for
developing a legal infrastructure which is better integrated into
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public health decision making processes. Lawyers dealing with
public health emergencies, in turn, must be sensitive to the needs of
decision makers and responders, and realize that law is never an end
onto itself, but good lawyering, particularly in crises, requires
flexibility, a willingness to compromise to protect the interests of the
community at large, and most importantly, an ability to find quick
and reasonable solutions, dictated by unfolding events.
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
TOPOFF 2, as artificial as it may have been, sadly contained the
grains of considerable truths as our new century has clearly taught us
in a very dramatic fashion, that yesterday's unthinkable occurrences
are likely to be today's reality. Our new world may be anything but
brave, but one thing it does seem to be is fragile and vulnerable. The
frightening convergence of science and terrorism has presented us
with a new battleground which, as seen in TOPOFF 2, taxes our
abilities to understand the nature of threats and to respond effectively.
The lessons learned through TOPOFF 2 and subsequent exercises
should lead to significant changes in how public and private agencies
react in emergency situations, and those lessons must be quickly
incorporated into law. It would be foolhardy to suggest that past
experiences in dealing with disasters be ignored, or basic, simple
tenants, such as the need for communication and coordination be
overlooked. Precedents, however, must be viewed cautiously, as
responses to bioterrorism will require a willingness to forge new
alliances and approaches to emergencies, and if law is to be relevant,
it must be shaped in ways that meet individual and community needs
simultaneously. Public health laws must be flexible enough to meet
immediate and future needs raised by crises, such as bioterrorist
attacks, in ways that will require creativity, harmonization and
flexibility, all traits which have been in short supply in the legal
context.
2000] 917
HeinOnline  -- 64 La. L. Rev. 917 2003-2004
HeinOnline  -- 64 La. L. Rev. 918 2003-2004
